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TRANSPARENCY ACROSS SEMIOTIC MODES:
AN ECOLOGICAL STANCE
1. Introduction 
The  word  transparency conflates  disparate  notions,  such  as  a  property  of  a  substance,
a behavioural  characteristic  of  a  person,  a  quality  of  a  phenomenal  state,  a  feature  of  an
organization,  a  trait  of  a  work of  art,  etc.  Accordingly,  discussions of transparency range
through  science,  engineering,  business,  and  humanities  (Art-Azbuka  2005;  Brin  1998;
Florenskij  1993; Metzinger 2003; Podoroga 1995; Rowe and Slutsky 1982; Vattimo 1992,
etc.). Therefore, the notion of transparency can surely claim a transdisciplinary status. 
Is it only the shared vocabulary that marks connections between various displays of
transparency in disparate spheres? Are there any general statements that one can make about
‘semiotic modes’1 of transparency in terms of cognitive processes? In search of answers to
these questions, I focus here on three areas in which the term ‘transparent’ is used more often:
natural sciences, visual arts, and linguistics. Exploring the ways we think about transparency
in these spheres, I take an ‘ecological stance’, seeking, in particular, to enhance the potential
of  the  ecological  view  of  cognition.  According  to  the  latter,  mental  entities  (meanings,
concepts, images, aesthetic experiences, etc.) are viewed as dynamic, embodied, situationally
embedded,  and distributed. The ecological  view of cognition stands in contrast  to a more
familiar  assumption  of  present-day  semantics  according  to  which  conceptual  entities  are
discrete ‘chunks’ of knowledge stored in memory and activated in discourse. 
1 The term ‘mode’ is taken here to refer to a set of socially and culturally shaped resources for making meaning,
such as writing and still  image on the page, sound and moving image on the screen, speech, gesture,  gaze,
posture in embodied interaction, etc. (“Mode”2012, IS).
2The basic premise of this research is that similar cognitive mechanisms are at work
both when one perceives transparency of material substances in the natural world and when
one deals  with its  manifestations in  visual  and verbal  semiotic  modes.  Such an approach
proceeds from the presumption that both vision and language are inherently rooted in the
human body, or embodied (Clark 2008; Kiverstein and Clark 2009). In consonance with the
postulates of embodied dynamicism (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991), visual images and
linguistic units are regarded here as processes grounded in bodily actions, and not as static
end  products  of  the  workings  of  human  brain.  These  processes  are  immersed  in  their
environment (ibid.), or situationally embedded, and may require some technological devices
for  their  realization,  i.e.  may  be  distributed (Hutchins  1995).  Thus my  focus  is  on  how
transparency  is  perceived  visually,  enacted  cognitively,  re-enacted  symbolically,  and
instantiated discursively to establish particular effects. 
This chapter falls into six sections. Section 2, which follows the Introduction, lays the
groundwork for research by providing the definitions for the terms ‘visual perception’ and
‘transparency’ that  are  basic  for  this  study as  well  as  bringing to  light  some features  of
transparent  substances  which  are  perceived  by  observers  and,  being  found  relevant,  are
entrenched in language. Section 3 traces recent paradigm shifts in cognitive semantics and
aesthetics  with  the  aim  to  provide  an  adequate  explanatory  framework  for  investigating
transparency displays in visual and verbal semiotic modes. This sets the stage for considering
in Section 4 how the transparency effect is achieved in painting, and in Section 5 – in verbal
communication. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks on why the analysis of
transparency manifestations in dissimilar modes should be underpinned with an ecological
view on semiosis. 
2. Laying the groundwork 
This section considers those visually perceived characteristics of transparent substances in the
physical world which are rendered in painting with the help of certain techniques and are laid
down in the English language. This raises the issue of finding an adequate framework within
which instantiations of transparency in different semiotic modes could be explained. 
Vision is a neurocognitive process that takes the light in our eye as input, the output
being the object we see:
It is a complex yet fast process that organizes meaningless patches of light on the retina into objects we
perceive, that is, objects with potentially meaningful properties such as shape and spatial arrangement of
parts. (van der Helm 2014: 1)
3In other words, when a living being sees an object, physical stimulations provided by one of
the senses – sight – are transduced into neural signals which travel to the brain where they
become  sensations.  Further  interpreted  by  making  connections  with  images  (which  are  a
variety of knowledge formats), sensations become perceptions (Goldstein 2009: 6). A similar
cognitive process operates on information taken in through language, though in this case other
kinds of knowledge are involved – concepts, emotions, etc.
Visual  perception  of  transparent  entities  is  inherently  ‘viewpointed’ for  it  is  hardly
possible to speak of transparency of an object irrespective of its observer. A proof to that can
be found in a dictionary definition of the word  transparent  which reflects the naїve idea  of
transparency shared by native speakers:  “having the property of transmitting light without
appreciable scattering so that bodies lying behind are clearly seen” (“Transparent” 2015b, IS).
From this definition it follows that transparency is regarded not only as an intrinsic property
of certain substances (“transmitting light without appreciable scattering”); it also relates to
some  possibilities  that  transparent  substances  offer  their  observers  (“so  that  bodies  lying
behind are clearly seen”). Incorporation of the observer’s viewpoint into the meaning of the
word transparent can be traced as far back as its Latin origin: transparere comes from trans –
‘through’ and parere – ‘appear’ (“Transparent” 2015a, IS). 
Thus the property of being transparent is regarded by speakers of English, on the one
hand, as a material (objective) characteristic of certain things and media, and on the other
hand, as a phenomenal (cognitive, subjective) condition of being perceived by an observer.
Put another way, the word transparent contains information both on the intrinsic properties of
transparent objects and on their extrinsic characteristics, or affordances. 
The term ‘affordance’ originated  in  the work of  James  J. Gibson on perception  and
action (Gibson 1979), which marks a turning point from the then widespread view that ideas
of what  the world is  like are  stable entities  stored in the mind as mental  representations.
Working in the interactionist context, Gibson argues that the observer’s idea of a situation
emerges in the course of perceiving it. Gibson defines affordances as what the environment
offers the observer, what it  provides or  furnishes (ibid.: 285). Thus affordances refer to the
‘action possibilities’ of objects in their environments, e.g., a ledge affords sitting, air affords
breathing  or  flying,  and  water  affords  drinking,  bathing,  or  swimming.  Environmentally
embedded objects offer their observers stimuli for acting, as if “inviting” them to act upon the
objects (Scorolli and Borghi 2008: 11). Potential uses of objects arise from their properties as
4perceived  by  the  observer  and  as  conditioned  by  his/her  needs  and  capabilities  since
perception is always selective (“Affordance”2012, IS). 
The  term ‘affordance’ can  be  applied  not  only to  physical  actions,  but  to  acts  of
perception  as  well,  since  cognition  is  viewed  by  present-day  scholars  as  internalized
movement  (Llinas  2001:  ix  ff.),  i.e.  a  variety  of  action.  Besides,  visual  perception,  in
particular, involves an active observer who is moving his/her eyes, head and body relative to
the  environment;  this  movement  results  in  a  constantly  changing  image  on  the  retina
(Goldstein 1981: 191). The treatment of transparency as an affordance implies the rejection
the idea of visual perception as something passive, something that happens to us: 
Traditional approaches to vision have tended to suppose that vision happens to us. It is a phenomenon on
the retina and structures in the brain […]. I want to point out what ought to be entirely obvious anyway,
namely that seeing is, in many ways, a bodily activity. Seeing involves moving the eyes and head and
body. More important, movements of your eyes or your head or your body actively produce changes in
sensory stimulation to your eyes. Or, put differently, how things look depends, in subtle and fine-grained
ways, on what you do. Approach an object, and it looms in your visual field. Now turn away: it leaves
your field of view. Now shut your eyes: it is gone. Walk around the object and its profile changes. In these
and many other ways, there are patterns of dependence between simple sensory stimulation on the one
hand and your own bodily movement on the other. It should be clear that a central task for any perceiving
organism is to master these dynamic patterns of sensory stimulation and movement. (Nöe 2009: 59-60)
Thus, being dependent on active interaction between our body, a transparent substance
and  the  environment,  transparency  is  done,  or  enacted  by  observers,  not  just  perceived
passively by them. 
The  ‘alluring’  capacity  of  transparent  substances  is  somewhat  different  from  the
affordances of things like a ledge; when one perceives a transparent object or medium, one
interacts with it visually, piercing it with one’s glance, observing things that are behind it.
Since in a standard situation a living being with normal eyesight is sure to see through a
transparent substance, its respective affordance is rather strong. Transparent substances might
have negative  affordances  as  well,  e.g.,  one  cannot  touch objects  visible  through a  glass
surface or smell objects through a layer of water.
Remaining invariant in most situations, the property of being transparent is not a fixed
characteristic of a certain substance, but a variable one: like all affordances, it depends upon
the environment (Gibson 1979: 201). Transparency of an object or a medium may vary with
the change of situational parameters, such as the angle of observation, illumination, thickness
of the transparent layer, etc. For instance, a body of clear water looks transparent only in
broad daylight, when viewed at the right angle to the surface, and when the layer of water is
not very thick. When observed in darkness or at an acute angle, or from a boat which is out in
the open sea, the body of water loses its capacity of being penetrated by the eye. 
5For  different  bodies  of  water  the  degree  of  transparency  is  not  the  same,  which
generates the need for measuring it objectively, e.g., with the help of a Secchi disk lowered
into water on a line. The distance at which the disk cannot be seen any longer is taken as a
measure of transparency of water – the Secchi depth. The measurements are to be taken in a
situation  constrained  by  such  parameters  as  daytime,  absence  of  wind,  etc.  Measuring
transparency with the help of instruments is a way of transforming ‘nature’ (perception of a
transparent substance) into ‘culture’ (scientific capturing).
Situational  variability  of  transparency is  marked lexically  in  a  number  of  English
adjectives which are grouped according to the scale “transparent – semi-transparent – non-
transparent”,  e.g.,  transparent/pellucid/limpid/clear/see-through/diaphanous  –  semi-
transparent/translucent/cloudy/muddy/turbid  –  non-transparent/opaque/lightproof.  Scalarity
of  transparency is  also  grammaticalized  in  the  degrees  of  comparison of  adjectives,  e.g.,
transparent: more transparent – the most transparent.
An object or a medium can be made penetrable to the human eye technologically, with
the  help  of  night  observation  devices,  radars  and  periscopes,  probes  and  sensors,  X-ray,
ultrasonic scanning, magnetic resonance imaging, etc. The number and penetration capacity
of  such  devices  grow  exponentially,  entailing  a  host  of  ethical  issues.  Availability  of
‘amplifiers’ of natural vision brings up linguistic points as well,  for example, whether the
word transparent is applicable in respective contexts. According to our data, it can be used in
such contexts only metaphorically. Yet the very possibility of ‘technological amplification’ of
the observer’s visual capacity makes the case for using the distributed cognition framework in
substantiating the theoretical foundations for the study of transparency across semiotic modes.
In order to accommodate the extrinsic, observer-dependent properties of transparent
substances (reliance on the neuro-cognitive processes in the brain of the observer and on
his/her viewpoint, or embodiment; dependence on the movement of the observation point, or
dynamism;  relatedness  to  environmental  factors,  or  situatedness;  the  possibility  of  being
technologically amplified, or its distributed nature), one needs a methodological framework
that will enable researchers to bring to light the cognitive mechanisms at work behind the
displays of transparency in different semiotic modes. Such a framework can be provided by
‘enactivism’, which regards cognition as a product of dynamic interaction between an agent
and its environment. The section that follows aims to explicate the idea of enactivism through
paradigm shifts  in  semantics  and  aesthetic  thought  as  well  as  to  outline  an  explanatory
framework for studying manifestations of transparency in disparate semiotic modes. 
63.  Paradigm shifts  in cognitive semantics and aesthetics:  moving toward
enactivism 
Since transparency is a cognitive entity that emerges in the interaction of the observer with the
thing observed and the environment, it can be regarded as a variety of meaning in a broader
sense.  The  problem of  meaning  is  a  perennial  one  for  philosophy, linguistics,  and  other
humanities. Each new paradigm suggests a new solution to it, depending on how it views
language, its correlation with thought and the world around, the nature of mind and cognition,
and ultimately, human nature itself. 
Structural  linguistics  reduces  the  meaning  of  a  linguistic  sign  to  its  value  in  the
language system (de Saussure 1916/2011). Logical semantics equates meaning with truth and
reference (Barwise and Perry 1999; Montague 1974). In contrast to them, cognitive semantics
presumes  that  meaning  is  a  cognitive  phenomenon  and  thus  cannot  be  reduced  to  the
correlation of a linguistic expression with other signs or its reference to the world. What we
call ‘reality’ is not something objectively given to us, but rather a function of our cognition
(Lakoff 1977; Lakoff and Thompson 1975; Langacker 1978; Talmy 1975, 1978). 
 Though cognitive semantics in all  its versions takes the conceptualizer’s view into
account, it does not offer a uniform solution to the problem of meaning. Such strains as early
cognitivism, connectionism, embodied dynamicism, and enactivism vary significantly in their
approach to meaning. 
Cognitivists  of  the  1970s (Fodor  1975; Pylyshyn  1980)  base  their  views  on  the
presumption that meanings are stable self-contained mental entities which reflect the world.
They are stored in memory and verbalized in language. To explain the workings of the mind,
the proponents of this approach tend to adopt the computational metaphor. 
Connectionists,  who  represent  the  cognitive  science  of  the  1980s  (McClelland,
Rumelhart 1986), consider meaning to be an emergent entity construed in a situational setting,
i.e. created and re-created anew in each new context. For connectionists, meaning is not a
mental representation, but a process, a mental act. The computational metaphor of the mind
makes room for the metaphor of an emergent dynamic system embedded into the situation (cf.
van Gelder and Port 1995).
In the cognitive semantics of the 1990s (Varela  et al. 1991), meaning is regarded as
embodied,  i.e.  intrinsically  linked  to  the  human  body. This  trend  of  cognitive  semantics
imbues the presumptions of embedded dynamicism with those of embodiment.
7In the 21st century, within the embodied/embedded dynamicist paradigm there emerges
the enactivist strain of thought, which regards cognition as a situated activity that spans a
systemic totality embracing the human conceptualizer’s brain,  body, and the world (Clark
2005;  2008).  From  the  enactivist  perspective,  sense-making  is  ‘enactment’  of  the
conceptualizer in the environment, where the latter is understood broadly, as the whole world.
In  Andy Clark’s parlance,  cognition  leaks  out  into  the  body and  the  world  (Clark  2008:
xxviii). 
All  this  brings  enactivism closer  to  the  ‘distributed  cognition  approach’ (Hutchins
1995)  whose  proponents  claim that  mental  processes  can  depend  on  activity  beyond  the
immediate  locus  of  the  individual  brain  (Pepperell  2001:  120).  Yet  enactivism  and  the
distributed cognition approach should not, as Julian Kiverstein and Andy Clark maintain, be
considered  as  “one  church”  (Kiverstein  and  Clark  2009).  They  could  be  seen  as
complementary rather than conflicting, which holds promise of grafting them together within
a broader ‘ecological framework’ which relates language to the environment it is practiced in,
thus  focusing on the study of plant-animal-human-culture formations (Fill  and Steffenson
2014: 3). 
The ecological approach is transdisciplinary: beside cognitive linguistics, discussions
of ecologism range through philosophy, psychology, biology, etc. (ibid.: 1). Looking across
disciplinary waters to the arts, one can see that in recent decades the ideas of dynamism and
distribution of cognitive processes across internal (within the bounds of the human body) and
external (within the environment understood broadly) structures, which are fundamental for
ecologism, started to penetrate into the sphere of aesthetics (Gaut 1997; Pepperell 2011).
The issue  of  where  artistic  experience  is  located  evokes  a  long-running debate  of
objectivists and subjectivists. The position of the latter is summed up in the “beauty is in the
eye of the beholder” maxim which implies that perception of beauty is subjective. The idea
dates back to ancient times and does not seem to have a recorded origin. Yet a number of
outstanding thinkers have expressed much the same thought – that qualities like beauty reside
not in objects being contemplated, but in the subjective experience of the contemplator (John
Lyly,  Euphues and his England  (1868); William Shakespeare,  Love’s Labour’s Lost  (1773);
David Hume, Essays, Moral and Political (1875); etc.). 
Viewing aesthetic experience as a mental phenomenon, present-day neuroaestheticians
endeavour to explain the impact of artistic forms by turning to neural processes. They look for
the brain to account for subjective qualities in the visual arts, music, etc. (Zeki 1999). Yet
factors that bear on how artworks operate also include social, cultural, economic, historic and
8other  kinds  of  influences.  Therefore,  rapidly  gaining  in  popularity  today  is  an  approach
according to which aesthetic experience is not located in the mind (see also the distributed
cognition approach) but extends much beyond. Its basic presumptions are best summed up by
Robert Pepperell, who presents a view of thinking about aesthetic experience which he terms
‘extensionism’:
The experience of looking at a work of art, as described here,  does not assume an essential division
between the external object and the internal subjective mind of the viewer. Rather, one extends to the
other, forming a continuum in which the mind reaches out to the work as much as the work reaches into
the mind. In this way the mind, the works, and indeed the artist, become fused. The depth and richness of
this  fusion  –  what  we might  call  the  level  of  aesthetic  experience  – is  determined  by the  skill  and
intelligence invested by the artist in the artwork and the receptivity of the viewer in interpreting that skill
and intelligence. This fusion and all the mental properties that go to make it up have no simple location,
to use Whitehead’s phrase. They are distributed in time and space, woven at every level into myriad other
objects  and  events;  they  are  functions  of  minds  that  extend  far  beyond  space  of  any  brain  or  any
immediate present. (Pepperell 2001: 120-121)
Extensionism emphasizes  continuities  between objects  and events rather  than distinctions,
thus denying an impermeable boundary between a work of art and its experiencer:
[…] in a certain sense to be conscious of something is to be that something; the mind extends to all the
things we are mindful of.  (ibid..: 121)
Extensionism is grounded in the idea that objects have extended dimensions, what Pepperell
refers to as dependent, or secondary, properties (ibid.: 116) (cf. Gibson’s affordances). These
secondary properties are treated as a proper part of an art object. 
Thus, the dynamics of views on the nature of aesthetic experience look similar to the
evolution of approaches to the nature of meaning: from objectivism – through embodiment/
embeddedness  –  to  enactivism/extensionism.  This  is  not  surprising  since  both  aesthetic
experience and senses which emerge in verbal communication are mental phenomena and
therefore  their  scientific  descriptions  evolve  in  line  with  the  general  tendency  towards
ecologism  which  is  traced  in  the  humanities.  Given  that,  one  may  regard  ‘ecological
cognitivism’ as a general principle which presents itself under different names (‘enactivism’,
‘distributed cognition’, ‘extensionism’) in diverse spheres. It can provide a necessary basis for
interpreting manifestations  of  transparency in  the visual  arts  (namely, in  painting)  and in
verbal communication against some shared theoretical background.
4. Artistic representation of transparent substances
Of our particular interest in this section are the means of representing transparent substances
9in  painting. Drawing a distinction  between transparent  media  (air,  water)  and transparent
objects (a glass, a crystal), we focus on the ways of depicting transparent air as the medium
through which people visually perceive objects. Since air is the main living environment for
people, its transparency is a precondition for visual perception of the material world around. 
Artistic methods of representing transparent air are usually classified in compliance
with two psychological theories of space perception – the ‘air theory’ and the ‘ground theory’
(Goldstein 1981: 191). 
According to the former, visual space is delineated by the information contained in an
object or an array of objects in the air, known as ‘depth cues’ such as interposition, relative
size, etc. (ibid.). This psychological ‘air theory’ underpins the theory of perspective, which
distinguishes between linear and aerial perspectives in painting. The linear perspective has to
do with how the size of an object seems to diminish with the increase of distance from which
it is viewed. Also, one of the main indicators of distance is that the farther away an object is,
the closer seem to be the elements of its texture (Demidov 1987: 53). This phenomenon is
well  known  to  professional  military  men  who  are  specially  trained  to  estimate  distance
visually by texture indicators. They know, for instance, that when buttons on the enemy’s
uniform can be seen, they are 200 m away, and when the enemy’s eyes are discernible, they
are 50 meters away (ibid.). This property is exploited by painters who apply the principle of
linear perspective in their work.  The aerial perspective concerns the way colours pale the
farther away they are from the eye of the observer. Hence, in painting objects ought to be
finished less carefully the farther away they are from the viewer. Jointly, the two perspectives
create a convincing illusion of depth and distance, of three dimensions on a two-dimensional
plane,  or in our case,  of a body of transparent air  which lies between the object and the
observer, separating and at the same time uniting them.
According to the ‘ground theory’ of space perception (Gibson 1979), visual space is
defined by the  ground – a  continuous  surface  or  array of  adjoining  surfaces,  and not  by
objects in the air, as the ‘air theory’ presumes. A well-known example of this ground-based
information is the texture gradient (a geometrical correlate of physical distance). 
If one sees something atmospherically homogeneous and there are no textures in the
field of vision, the brain gets deprived of an important indicator which helps a person find
his/her bearings in space. This may result in all kinds of optical illusions. One of the oldest
and the most spectacular ones is the ‘moon illusion’, when the moon looks bigger when it is
close to the horizon. The illusion can be dispelled by holding a coin up to the moon as it rises
in the sky; the coin serves as a point of reference allowing one to see that the moon remains
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the same size both at  the horizon and in zenith (Demidov 1987: 59). Though there is no
universally accepted explanation of the ‘moon illusion’, most researchers nowadays agree that
the reason why the moon looks bigger at the horizon is cognitive by nature (Kaufman 2000:
500). The illusion occurs because in the night air there are no textures, and the mind of an
observer  focuses  on  the  earth’s textures,  the  horizon  in  particular.  Since  we  know  from
experience that an object which is close to the horizon is very far away, we deduce that it
should look smaller than it actually is. Respectively, the moon should have been smaller when
close to the horizon, so we endow it with huge dimensions (ibid.). 
The  ‘ground theory’ of  visual  perception  helps  to  explain,  for  instance,  the  effect
achieved in the surrealist painting by Salvador Dali in his “Dream Caused by the Flight of a
Bee Around a Pomegranate a Second Before Awakening”, which depicts a reclining nude
hovering in her sleep above a tiny flat island in a boundless sea. She is threatened by a flying
monster  of  a  fish  and  two  giant  tigers  which  emerge  from  a  pomegranate  hanging  in
transparent  air  close to  the horizon.  Such location of  the pomegranate endows it  and the
ferocious creatures respectively with huge dimensions (cf. Fig. 1): 
Figure 1. Salvador Dali,  “Dream Caused by the Flight of a Bee Around a Pomegranate a
Second Before Awakening” (1944)
Shrinking and blurring distant shapes, together with weakening the tones, are not the
only way of creating perspective, in particular, when depicting masses of transparent air. An
effective technique of rendering transparent air on canvas was suggested by George Seurat. It
can be seen in his best-known painting “A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande
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Jatte” that depicts people relaxing in a suburban park on an island in the Seine River (cf.
Fig. 2): 
Figure 2. George Seurat, “A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte” (1884)
The  artist  draws  multitudes  of  small  dots,  in  complementary colours,  which,  when
viewed from a distance, create an illusion of luminous objects. Due to this technique, masses
of air seem to become translucent. An artistic description of the impact such a technique,
called ‘pointillism’,  produces on the viewer is  given in  the following extract  from Irving
Stone’s “Lust for Life”:
(1) “If you'll sit on this stool, Monsieur Van Gogh.”
  Vincent climbed up on the stool and looked at the canvas spread out before him. It was like nothing he
had  ever  seen  before,  either  in  art  or  life.  The  scene  represented  the  Island  of  the  Grande  Jatte.
Architectural human beings,  made out of infinitely graduated points of colour  , stood up like poles in a
Gothic cathedral. The grass, the river, the boats, the trees, all were vague and abstract masses of dotted
light. The canvas was done in all the brightest shades of the palette, lighter than those Manet or Degas or
even Gauguin dared to use. The picture was a withdrawal into a region of almost abstract harmony. If it
was alive, it was not with the life of nature. The air was   filled with glittering luminosity, but there was not
a breath to be found anywhere. It was a still life of vibrant life, from which movement had been forever
banished.
  Gauguin stood at Vincent's side and laughed at the expression on his face.
  “It's all right, Vincent, Georges’s canvases strike everyone that way the first time they look at them.
Out with it! What do you think?”  (Stone 1984: 286, emphasis mine. – O.M.)
The expressions The grass, the river, the boats, the trees, all were vague and abstract masses
of dotted light  and  The air was filled with glittering luminosity are metaphorical since the
paint on the canvas does not irradiate light, neither is it luminous or pellucid. Such metaphors
are widespread in art criticism since they capture aesthetic qualities of an artwork, not factual,
material ones (Gaut 1997: 230). The metaphorical expressions above depict the effect which
Seurat’s painting  produces  on  its  viewer, bringing together  a  motley bunch of  its  factual
properties,  such  as  extreme  contrasts  of  saturation  and  hue,  diminished  objects,
superimposition of shapes, etc. In a similar way, describing the air in a painting as transparent
is also a metaphor since the word does not refer to factual properties of the canvas, but to the
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way the viewer perceives shapes and colours in it. 
The ‘transparency’ metaphor in aesthetics has its counterpart in verbal communication.
This issue is addressed in the following section. 
5. Manipulating transparency effect in verbal communication
The ‘transparency’ metaphor is deeply ingrained in the cognitive system of English speakers.
According to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING
IS SEEING is pervasive in English (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 48). It forms the basis for such
linguistic expressions as I see what you’re saying. It looks different from my point of view, etc.
(ibid.). This metaphor has an obvious  extension (Kövecses 2010:  53)  UNDERSTANDING IS
SEEING THROUGH A TRANSPARENT SUBSTANCE,  as  the following utterances illustrate:
The argument is clear. It was a murky discussion. Could you elucidate your remarks? It's a
transparent argument. The discussion was opaque. (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 48). Furthermore,
the already extended conceptual metaphor can be further extended into UNDERSTANDING IS
SEEING  THROUGH  A  TRANSPARENT  LINGUISTIC  EXPRESSION by  embedding  the
metaphor LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION IS A TRANSPARENT SUBSTANCE. 
The naїve view of how understanding is achieved in communication agrees with the
ideas of the first generation of cognitive scientists, yet it runs counter to the views of those
cognitive linguists who adhere to the enactivist conception, where meanings are regarded as
enacted,  or  construed  in  a  broader  context.  Hence,  from  the  enactivist  (or  ecological)
perspective it makes no sense speaking of transparency as a property of linguistic expressions,
which agrees with poetic intuitions of Fyodor I. Tyutchev, a 19th-c. Russian poet, who wrote in
his  poem  "Silentium!" A thought  once  uttered  is  untrue (Rus.  Мысль  изреченная  есть
ложь). This line can be interpreted in such a way: the linguistic expression into which the
speaker’s thoughts are enveloped is not capable of conveying them in all their complexity.
Thus any linguistic sign a priori simplifies the state of things since it cannot embrace all the
wealth of thoughts and feelings of the addresser; moreover, the addressee shall also interpret
the content of the sign according to his/her own experience. 
As it has been shown in Section 3, meaning does not reside in linguistic expressions,
neither is it  contained in the minds of language users. Meaning construction is an on-line
mental  activity  whereby  speech  participants  jointly  create  meanings  on  the  basis  of
underspecified  linguistic  units.  This  agrees  with  the  contemporary  vision  of speech
communication, summed up by a communication theorist John D. Peters: representing one’s
interiority via signs is not possible in a direct way; meaning is an incomplete project; a sign
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surrenders to the interpreter the right of completing determination (Peters 1999: 265).  By
characterizing communication as the meeting of minds,  Peters emphasized that  body also
counts (ibid.: 269). 
In agreement with contemporary views on human communication, we argue here that
transparency of a linguistic expression is always relative, yet it is taken to be absolute in a
normative case of communication. Thus not much can actually be said about transparency as a
property of a linguistic sign if it is just a background element in the overall ‘picture’ observed
by communicants. It is as if when we are looking through a window pane, we see the street,
people, cars passing by, etc. We just do not notice the window pane. But if we redirect our
eyes onto the latter, the view of the street dissolves as if by magic; instead, we see tiny specs
and scratches on the glass which a moment ago we took to be perfectly transparent. Similarly,
in our analysis of transparency of verbal expressions we shall proceed from deviant cases,
namely those when transparency of the conductive medium (verbal expressions) varies from
slightly vague through obscure to opaque.
Let us consider a case of deviant communication where the content of the utterance is
factually false, yet with the help of this utterance the addresser manages to create a true,
though simplified, picture of the real state of things:
(2) “Beauregard!” Drummond cried.
“You mean the dog?” After Charlie left home, Drummond took in two retired dog track greyhounds,
John-Paul Jones, who lived two or three years, and Beauregard, who lasted about a year longer.
“We forgot to get someone to look after him while we’re away!”
“No, no, it’s fine. Beauregard is—” Charlie stopped short of saying, “dead,” seeking to soften it. He was
clumsy with euphemisms. “Beauregard’s with Mom.” 
Drummond’s face twisted in mystification. “Now how would Beauregard have gotten all the way down to
Monroeville?”
It sounded awfully Alzheimer’s-y.   (Thomson 2010: 92)
Unwilling to upset his elderly father who has Alzheimer disease, Charlie, the main character
of  Keith Thomson’s novel Once a Spy, leads him into error by making him believe that his
dog (Beauregard) is safe with his wife, Charlie’s mother, whom he believes to be dead, but his
father does not. Factually, he tells a lie, since he knows that the dog has died, but with this lie
Charlie manages to evoke in his father the truest image of himself, that of a caring son. Thus,
the  expression  with  Mom,  though  not  prototypically  transparent  in  this  context,  can  be
qualified as slightly vague. 
The  extract  below  illustrates  the  opposite  case,  when  a  factually  true  utterance
attempts to mislead the addressee as to the true state of things:
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(3) “Monna Agnese,” said Salimbeni, unstirred, “will not live beyond this month. She 
lies abed at Rocca di Tentennano and takes no nourishment.”
“It is hard,” mumbled one of the Biccherna magistrates, “to eat, when you are not 
 fed!” (Fortier 2011: 240)
 The extract from Anne Fortier’s novel Juliet contains two replicas – the first one, uttered by
one of the characters, a villain (Salimbieni), is addressed collectively to magistrates, the other,
by one of the magistrates – to no one in particular. In respect to the first replica, the second
one serves as a frame that reconstructs the true state of things and allows one to see that the
first  replica  is  not  transparent.  The  first  replica,  which  contains  the  predicate  takes  no
nourishment,  distorts the true state of things: the villain intends to starve Monna Agnese to
death but makes believe that she does not take food of her own accord. He attempts to deceive
the addressees by failing to provide some highly relevant information (<I don’t give her any
food>), thus generating a false presupposition <She takes no food of her own accord> that is
prototypical for the expression  take no food.  Being factually true,  this  utterance does not
represent the speaker authentically, thus it is not transparent to addressees, i.e. obscure. 
The  case  of  opaqueness  as  partial  transparency is  illustrated  by  code  words,  like
battery instead of body, in the following extract: 
(4) Watching from the driver’s seat of the Caprice, Mortimer dialed a local number. One ring and a
man answered, “Road service and towing.”
    “Hi, I’ve got a dead battery,” Mortimer said.  
        “No problem, man. Where are you at?”
       “Montclair, at the library.”
       “I got a guy I can get there in fifteen, twenty minutes.”
       “Great, thank you.” Mortimer hung up. (Thomson 2010: 105)
This exchange takes place between the killer (Mortimer) and his accomplices. Since it is not
safe to announce over the phone that there is a dead body in the car, the killer resorts to a code
which is  based  on reframing the  meaning of  the  word  dead:  it  means ‘not  living’ when
combined  with  body (the  hidden  meaning  of  the  exchange)  and  ‘flat’ in  a  context  with
‘battery’ (the overt meaning for an accidental eavesdropper).
The examples given above present an illustration of the fact recognized in all strains of
cognitive linguistics (save the early cognitivism of the 1970s)  that the meaning of linguistic
units is negotiated in discourse by its participants, in other words, it is construed in discourse,
but not projected into it. The process of meaning negotiation, as the following extract from the
same novel demonstrates, can be rather long and the participants may exchange their roles
(the addresser – the addressee) repeatedly:
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(5) Drummond remained in his seat. “Why don’t we drive?”
There were too many bullet holes in the truck to count — the light streaming through them and into the
cab resembled pickup sticks in mid-toss. Much of what had been the windows lay in fragments on streets
between Fillmore and here. The rear tires were ribbons. Hurrying around the hood, Charlie left it at,
“The truck’s hot.”
“I meant why don’t we get a car,” Drummond said.
“There’s about a zero chance of even seeing a taxi around here now.” His patience evaporating, Charlie
yanked open Drummond’s door.
“Our own car, I mean.”
Charlie took Drummond by the elbow to help him from the truck. Or pull him if need be. “You really think
it would be a good idea to go back to Prospect Place right now and get your Oldsmobile?”
“No, hot-wire a car here.” (Thomson 2010: 78)
This  dialogue  between  Сharlie  and his  father,  Drummond,  who have  barely  managed  to
escape from a hot pursuit in a truck, comes down to how they could continue their trip. On
hearing his father’s suggestion to resume driving, Charlie assumes that he means using their
truck again, which is not possible since its engine is hot and the truck itself is badly damaged.
Specifying that he means a car, not just their truck, Drummond leads his son to believe that he
has a taxi in mind, yet even this conjecture turns out to be wrong – Charlie's father means ‘his
own car’. The third attempt to interpret the ‘driving’ situation that Drummond has in mind is
also a failure.  ‘His own car’ is not his ‘father’s Oldsmobile’ and it turns out that the old man
suggests stealing a car, as the bottom line of their conversation proves (No, hot-wire a car
here). Projecting the psychological theories of space perception considered in Section 4 onto
examining communicative transparency/opacity shows that the ‘air theory’ seems a better fit
for construing a trajectory of how sense-making might be negotiated.  Here, by filling in the
contours of the ‘driving’ situation with more and more specific details, Charlie's father finally
manages to convey his message. 
6. Concluding remarks
Approaching transparency not as an objective characteristic of particular things or media, but
as  an  affordance  offered  by  them to  their  observers  in  certain  situational  environments,
extends  the  limits  of  transparency from the  mind into  the  body, and further,  beyond  the
boundaries of the body into the environment. 
The  phenomenon  of  transparency demonstrates  quite  a  few functional  similarities
across its manifestations in various spheres, particularly, in the material/physical world, in
painting, and in everyday communication. The divergences are conditioned by the resources
available within a respective semiotic mode. Unlike physical transparency, manifestations of
imaginary transparency in the visual arts and everyday communication give rise to meaning
and crystallize the sense of a work of art or verbal exchange in the process of interpretation.
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The nature of this process is best captured by the enactivist approach, which proves to be
deeply ecological.
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